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Abstract 
A good portion of today's investigations include, at least in part, an examination 
of the user's web history.  Although it has lost ground over the past several years, 
Microsoft's Internet Explorer still accounts for a large portion of the web browser 
market share.  Most users are now aware that Internet Explorer will save 
browsing history, user names, passwords and form history.  Consequently some 
users seek to eliminate these artifacts, leaving behind less evidence for examiners 
to discover during investigations.  However, most users, and probably a good 
portion of examiners are unaware Automatic Crash Recovery can leave a gold 
mine of recent browsing history in spite of the users attempts to delete historical 
artifacts.  As investigators, we must continually be looking for new sources of 
evidence; Automatic Crash Recovery is it. 
Keywords:  Automatic Crash Recovery, ACR, Internet Explorer, IE8, IE9, 
Browsing history, RecoverRS, Compound files. 
1. INTRODUCTION TO AUTOMATIC CRASH RECOVERY 
In order to understand the potential value of Automatic Crash Recovery to 
investigators, some background in to what exactly Automatic Crash Recovery 
does is required.  According to Microsoft, "Automatic Crash Recovery (ACR) is a 
feature of Windows® Internet Explorer® 8 that can help to prevent the loss of 
work and productivity in the unlikely event of the browser crashing or hanging" 
(Microsoft, 2008, p. 3).  From the user's perspective, ACR is what provides the 
option to 'Restore Session' when Internet Explorer closes improperly.  Providing 
this functionality requires Internet Explorer to store numerous pieces of 
information about the history of the browsing session. 
ACR can be disabled by going to 'Tools' -> 'Internet Options' -> 'Advanced' and 
unchecking "Enable automatic crash recovery" in the 'Browsing' section.  
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Interestingly, research shows that even with ACR disabled, Internet Explorer will 
continue to store information for its use.  Similarly, research shows that even with 
InPrivate Browsing enabled, ACR artifacts will still be created. 
Several common "cleaning" utilities were tested and not a single utility removed 
the files created by ACR.  It appears that there is currently no way to prevent 
Internet Explorer from creating ACR artifacts and furthermore that the only 
reliable way for a user to remove ACR artifacts is to manually delete and 
overwrite them after each session. 
2. ARTIFACTS CREATED BY ACR 
The files of interest created by ACR are initially written to the 
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active 
directory in Windows 7 or the C:\Documents and Settings\<user>\Local 
Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active directory 
in Windows XP. 
Internet Explorer creates two types of files in this directory.  The first type uses 
the naming convention 'RecoveryStore.{<GUID>}.dat' and is created when 
Internet Explorer is first executed.  Referred to from this point on as the "recovery 
store file," only one such file is created regardless of the number of tabs or 
windows opened by the user (except when using InPrivate Browsing a second 
recovery store file is created for the InPrivate Browsing session).  The second 
type created uses the naming convention '{<GUID>}.dat'.  One of these files is 
created when Internet Explorer is first executed and one additional file is created 
for each additional tab or window that is opened.  These files will be referred to 
from this point on as the "tab data files."  The globally unique identifiers (GUIDs) 
created for both the recovery store files and the tab data files are in hexadecimal 
and display as ########-####-####-############.  The format of these GUIDs 
as well as the information they contain is explained in greater detail in the 
following section. 
When Internet Explorer is closed by the user, the recovery store file and the tab 
data files are removed from their existing locations and recreated in the 
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Last 
Active directory in Windows 7 or the C:\Documents and Settings\<user>\Local 
Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Last Active 
directory in Windows XP with new GUIDs.  Any GUIDs stored within the 
recovery store files and tab data files are also updated unless otherwise noted. 
One registry value that may be of interest during an investigation is 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\AutoRecover.  A 
DWORD value of 0x00000000 indicates that ACR is enabled; a DWORD value 
of 0x00000002 indicates that ACR is disabled.  As mentioned previously, ACR 
files will be created even when this value is set to 0x00000002, however this 
value may be an indication the user was attempting to hide their browsing 
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activities. 
Another registry key that may be of interest is HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\Recovery\Active.  When Internet Explorer is executed and the recovery 
store file is created, a new DWORD value is created in this key using the GUID 
of the recovery store file as the name and 0x00000000 as the value.  For example, 
if the recovery store file created was RecoveryStore.{3519D794-44E1-11E0-
8CA1-005056C00008}.dat, a new DWORD value named {3519D794-44E1-
11E0-8CA1-005056C00008} would be added to the key.  When Internet Explorer 
is closed properly, this value is deleted from the key.  This key appears to be what 
Internet Explorer checks to see if there are previous browsing sessions that can be 
recovered; manually adding previous ACR files to the 
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active 
directory and adding the GUID of the recovery store file to this registry key 
caused Internet Explorer to offer to restore the browsing session from the previous 
ACR files. 
Two other registry keys seen in Windows 7 environments are 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\AdminActive, which 
contains the GUID of the recovery store file currently open in Internet Explorer 
when run as Administrator and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\Recovery\PendingDelete, which contains the GUIDs of the tab data files 
currently being used by Internet Explorer. 
3. ANALYSIS OF ACR FILES 
By the very nature of their function, ACR files must store several key pieces of 
information that can be of use to investigators, such as dates, times, and browsing 
history that might be otherwise unavailable through other means.  In order to get 
the most from ACR artifacts and more importantly be able to articulate the 
method by which these artifacts are created and the process of recovering these 
artifacts, the next several sections will detail the file format and where key 
evidence may lie. 
3.1 GUID Format 
The GUID itself can provide some important information and is important to 
mention, most notably the date and time the file was created.  The first eight bytes 
of the GUID contain the date/time the file was created, or in other words, the 
date/time Internet Explorer was opened or closed (in the case of a recovery store 
file) or the date/time an individual tab was opened or closed (in the case of a tab 
data file).  The date/time is stored as the number of 100 nanoseconds since 
October 15, 1582 in little endian; a very similar format to the filetime format, 
which begins January 1, 1601. 
In order to calculate the date/time from the GUID, we must extract the first eight 
bytes from the GUID, then change the byte order from little endian to big endian.  
The first 4 bits of the big endian value represents the version number and are not 
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part of the date/time and we should ignore them.  We should then subtract 
0x146BF33E42C000 (5,748,192,000,000,000) to account for the difference in 
epochs and convert the resulting value to filetime (Parsonage, 2010).  A sample 
calculation can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Tab data file name:  6E165296-3930-11E0-8FE9-000C29EF1366 
Extract first 8 bytes:   6E165296-3930-11E0 
Convert to big endian: 0x11E039306E165296 
Drop the 1st 4 bits:  0x01E039306E165296 
Subtract 146BF33E42C000: 0x1CBCD3D2FD39296 (129422676989285014) 
Convert to FileTime: Tuesday, February 15, 2011 1:21:39 PM UTC 
 
Figure 1 (Sample Date/Time Calculation from Tab Data File) 
 
The last six bytes of the GUID contain a node ID that may also be of interest 
depending on the nature of the investigation.  In most cases, the node ID will be 
one of the available IEEE 802 medium access control (MAC) addresses on the 
system.  Yet in other instances, a random ID may be used (Leach, Mealling, & 
Salz, 2005).  The remaining two bytes of the GUID not previously mentioned 
make up the variant and sequence numbers that are of no value in the examination 
to these particular files. 
 3.2 ACR File Format 
Both the recovery store file and the tab data files are stored in a format called the 
compound file binary file format file, which will henceforth be referred to simply 
as a compound file.  These files may also be referred to as object linking and 
embedding (OLE) compound files.  Although some level knowledge regarding 
the compound file format is necessary when discussing carving these files from 
unallocated space, a complete explanation of the compound file format is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  In fact, a complete explanation of the compound file 
format has already been issued by Microsoft (2012a), titled [MS-CFB]: 
Compound File Binary File Format.  Fortunately, a basic understanding of the 
compound file format will suffice for examination of these files. 
Like many other files, compound files have a common header that can be used to 
locate and identify these files in unallocated space (discussed below).  However, 
that is where the similarities with other common file formats end.  A compound 
file functions very much like a File Allocation Table (FAT) file system on a disk; 
it contains a FAT, which tracks all sectors in the file, as well as directory entries 
and folder- and file-like structures.  The folders in a compound file are referred to 
as storages and the files are referred to as streams.  Like any other file system, a 
storage can contain other storages or streams.  A stream however cannot contain a 
storage. 
There is one other important structure within the compound file - the property set.  
Unlike a stream that can contain Unicode text of any length, a property set 
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follows a strict format.  Once again, a thorough explanation of property sets is 
well beyond the scope of this paper.  However, Microsoft has come to the rescue 
again with a complete explanation of property sets titled [MS-OLEPS]: Object 
Linking and Embedding (OLE) Property Set Data Structures (Microsoft, 2012b).  
For the purposes of examining ACR files, it is important to know that property 
sets contain one or more properties with a unique numeric identifier, a value type 
(such as date [VT_DATE], four-byte unsigned integer [VT_UI4] or Unicode 
string [VT_LPWSTR]) and a value. 
Making sense of compound files in their raw hexadecimal form can be a daunting 
task, even with an expert knowledge of the compound file format.  While it is 
possible to identify some text from the file, it is very difficult to attribute context 
without a great deal of time and effort.  Thankfully, there are numerous tools 
capable of reading the compound file.  Several forensics suites, such as the 
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) and EnCase, are capable of reading the compound file.  
There are also several free utilities available that will read compound files with 
varying success.  Another product available for reading these files is the 
Compound File Explorer (CFX) by CoCo Systems Ltd. 
(http://www.coco.co.uk/developers/CFX.html).  CFX is not free but well worth 
the price of 20 GBP.  Unlike most programs, CFX is capable of reading not only 
the text streams in compound files but also the property sets in an easy to read 
format.  Tools such as CFX are key to the examination of ACR artifacts as they 
present the information inside the compound file in a much easier to understand 
way and add a measure of context.  
3.3 The Recovery Store File 
The recovery store file contains basic information about the browsing session.  
Only one recovery store file is created by Internet Explorer regardless of the 
number of tabs or windows the user opens.  The one exception to this is when 
InPrivate browsing is used; when a user selects InPrivate browsing, a new 
window with the InPrivate Browsing logo opens, and a second recovery store file 
is created in the \Active directory.  If both the original window and the InPrivate 
browsing window remain open, both recovery store files will remain in the 
\Active folder.  Opening additional InPrivate browsing windows will not create 
additional recovery store files. 
At a minimum, each recovery store file contains three streams: the 'TS#' stream 
(where # is an integer starting at 0, discussed in greater detail in the next section), 
the 'FrameList' stream and the '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' 
stream.  A fourth stream, the 'ClosedTabList' stream, may also be present in some 
recovery store files (Figure 2).  The purpose of these streams and the data 
commonly stored within are described below. 
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Figure 2 (Recovery Store File Streams as Viewed in CFX) 
 
3.3. 1 The 'TS#' Stream 
 
A 'TS#' stream is created for each tab or window opened by the user.  The 
numbering for the 'TS#' stream starts at 0 and, in most cases, increments by 1 for 
each new tab or window that is opened by the user, although in a few cases, 
numbers appeared to be skipped.  The 'TS#' stream contains a list of the GUIDs of 
the tabs or windows that are currently open (or were if the entire session has been 
closed).  The GUIDs are broken in to four sections and are displayed as 
########-####-####-############.  Figure 3 shows four 16-byte GUIDs that 
were open in the last browsing session. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 (Sample 'TS0' Stream from Recovery Store File) 
 
The first eight bytes of each GUID are stored in little endian in a group of four 
bytes, two bytes and two bytes while the last eight bytes of the GUID are stored in 
big endian.  In order to associate the data in the 'TS#' stream with tab data files 
found on the system, some translation needs to occur.  For example, the first 
GUID shown in Figure 3 is displayed in the TS0 stream as 0xEF 50 89 E8 BA 12 
E0 11 86 80 00 50 56 C0 00 08; which translates to 0xE8 89 50 EF 12 BA 11 E0 
86 80 00 50 56 C0 00 08.  Therefore, the file '{E88950EF-12BA-11E0-8680-
005056C00008}.dat' should be associated with this recovery store file. 
3.3.2 The 'FrameList' Stream 
 
The format of the 'FrameList' stream is not entirely understood.  Each open 
window is represented by 12 bytes of data in three 4-byte chunks.  The first four 
bytes indicates the window number, shared with the # in the 'TS#' stream.  The 
second four bytes were 0x00000001 in each circumstance.  The final four bytes of 
the first window entry varied between test platforms, whereas the final four bytes 
of each subsequent window entry remained 0x00000004 across all platforms.  
These final four bytes of the first window entry may be 0x50000085 on one 
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computer, while they may be 0x00000005 on another computer under the same 
circumstances.  While this changed between platforms, the final four bytes 
remained the same in most circumstances throughout recovery store files per 
computer. 
It is possible to detect the use of InPrivate browsing through the 'FrameList' 
stream by examining the least significant bit of the last 4 bytes of the first window 
entry.  When InPrivate browsing is used, 0x40 (64) is added to the least 
significant bit.  For example, if the last 4 bytes of the first window entry are 
0x50000085 (Figure 4), the last four bytes of the first window entry will be 
0x500000C5 when InPrivate browsing is used (Figure 5).  The 'FrameList' stream 
created by Internet Explorer 9 Beta also appears to include the GUID of the 
currently active tab for each window (Figures 6-7). 
 
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 85 00 00 50 
 
Figure 4 (FrameList Stream with Single Window from Internet Explorer 8) 
 
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 C5 00 00 50 
 
Figure 5 (FrameList Stream with Single Window from Internet Explorer 8 
InPrivate Browsing) 
 
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 85 00 00 50 01 00 00 00 
01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 
04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 
         04 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 
 
Figure 6 (FrameList Stream with Multiple Windows from Internet Explorer 8) 
 
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 05 00 00 10 68 A5 87 CF 
A5 45 E0 11 8B CF 00 50 56 C0 00 08 01 00 00 00 
01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FB 92 4E D7 A5 45 E0 11 
8B CF 00 50 56 C0 00 08 02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 
04 00 00 00 E6 8A 09 DE A5 45 E0 11 8B CF 00 50 
         56 C0 00 08 
 
Figure 7 (FrameList Stream from Internet Explorer 9) 
 
3.3.3 The 'ClosedTabList' Stream 
 
The 'ClosedTabList' stream contains a list of the GUIDs for the tabs used in the 
browsing session, but were closed prior to closing the entire window.  These 
GUIDs are stored in the same format as those stored in the 'TS#' stream.  Even 
when a tab closed, the associated tab data file remains on the system until the user 
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exits Internet Explorer (Figure 8). 
 
 
 
Figure 8 (Sample 'ClosedTabList' Stream from Recovery Store File) 
 
3.3.4 The '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' Stream 
 
The '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' stream is a property set that 
usually contains three properties (Figure 9). 
 
The first common property value in this property set has a numeric ID of 
0x00000002 and a type value of VT_UI4 (4-byte unsigned integer).  The value of 
this property is initially set to 0x00000005.  When the browser crashes and the 
files ACR files remain in the '\Active' folder, this value remains 0x00000005.  
When the browser closes without process failure and the ACR files are moved to 
the '\Last Active' folder, this value is 0x00000006. 
The second common property value in this property set has a numeric ID of 
0x00000003 and a type value of VT_CLSID (CLSID).  This value should be the 
same as the GUID of the recovery store file. 
The final common property value in this property set has a numeric ID of 
0x00000007 and a type value of VT_CLSID (CLSID).  When the recovery store 
file is first created, this value contains a value of the GUID of the recovery store 
file minus a value of 2 to 4 in the least significant nibble (for example a value of 
93E43B49-3931-11E0-8FE9-000C29EF1366 in 0x00000003 may show a value 
of 93E43B46-3931-11E0-8FE9-000C29EF1366 in 0x00000007), meaning that 
this GUID was created 200 to 400 nanoseconds earlier than the GUID used as the 
file name. 
As mentioned previously, when Internet Explorer is closed without process failure 
by the user, the ACR files are removed from the '\Active' folder and recreated in 
the '\Last Active' folder.  When this occurs, the 0x00000003 value will reflect the 
new GUID of the recovery store file, while the 0x00000007 value will reflect the 
previous GUID of the recovery store file as it existed in the '\Active' folder.  From 
these two values, the date/time the browsing session was opened and the date/time 
the browsing session was closed can be determined. 
One other property ID of interest is 0x00000005.  If present, 0x00000005 should 
have a type value of VT_UI4 (4 byte unsigned integer).  In testing, the only time 
this value appeared in the recovery store files was when InPrivate browsing was 
used and on each occasion, it contained a value of 0x00000001.  
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Figure 9 (The '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' Stream of a 
Recovery Store File as Viewed in CFX) 
 
3.4 The Tab Data Files 
The tab data files contain more detailed information about the history of each tab 
in a browsing session (Figure 10).  As stated previously, one tab data file is 
created for each tab that is opened within the browsing session.  At a minimum, 
each tab data file contains a minimum of two streams; the 'TravelLog' stream and 
the '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' stream.  Additional streams are 
created for each page that is loaded within the tab and follow the naming 
convention 'TL#' where the # is a unique number starting at 0 and incrementing 
by 1 for each new page that is loaded.  A 'TL#' stream is not always created until 
the next page is loaded.  This will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 (Tab Data File Streams as Viewed in CFX) 
 
3.4.1 The 'TL#' Stream 
The 'TL#' stream contains detailed information about each page that is loaded 
within the tab.  The numbering for the 'TL#' stream starts at 0 and in most cases, 
increments by 1 for each new tab that is opened by the user, although in a few 
cases, numbers appeared to be skipped.  A 'TL#' stream is not always immediately 
created when a new page is opened within the tab.  Consequently, one may 
encounter a tab data file that contains one less 'TL#' stream than it appears it 
should or none at all if only one page was opened.  If a 'TL#' stream is not created 
immediately, once the next page is loaded within the tab, a 'TL#' stream will be 
created for the previous page.  If no 'TL#' streams are present, the URL of the first 
and only paged opened will still be stored in the property set within the 
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'{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' stream discussed later. 
The information stored in these streams varies among pages.  At minimum, the 
full URL and page title are stored at the beginning of the stream.  Other data 
stored inside this stream can include additional frames that are loaded within the 
page, links to content within the page and default text within text boxes on the 
page depending on the page content. 
Viewing these streams in a hex editor, it is clear the streams contain a mix of 
Unicode strings and binary data.  However, it is the Unicode strings that should 
interest us.  The binary data may be a mix of information stored by Internet 
Explorer, data stored as part of the compound file format, or slack space within 
the compound file 'sector'.  Because the Unicode and binary data are conflated, a 
hex editor and CFX are not the most efficient means of examining these streams.  
FTK does an excellent job of extracting the Unicode data when the stream is 
viewed using the 'View Files in Filtered Text Format' option.  A portion of a 
sample 'TL#' stream viewed using FTK's 'Filtered Text Format' option can be seen 
in Figure 11. 
 
http://www.cnn.com/ 
CNN.com - Breaking News, U.S., World, Weather, 
Entertainment & Video News 
http://www.cnn.com/ 
http://www.cnn.com/ 
http://www.cnn.com/ 
http://www.cnn.com/  
http://www.cnn.com/?fb_xd_fragment#?=&cb=f29c9ce8c7e4408&r
elation=parent&transport=fragment&frame=f23f6a82334bd84 
http://www.cnn.com/?fb_xd_fragment#?=&cb=f29c9ce8c7e4408&r
elation=parent&transport=fragment&frame=f23f6a82334bd84 
#?=&cb=f29c9ce8c7e4408&relation=parent&transport=fragment&
frame=f23f6a82334bd84 
http://www.cnn.com/ 
http://www.cnn.com/?fb_xd_fragment#?=&cb=f29c9ce8c7e4408&r
elation=parent&transport=fragment&frame=f23f6a82334bd84 
…… 
 
Figure 11  
(Sample 'TL#' Stream Viewed Using FTK's 'Filtered Text Format' Option) 
 
As shown in Figure 11, when viewed in this manner, the first line of the 'TL#' 
stream contains the full URL of the website.  The second line contains the title of 
the website.  Subsequent lines display additional information about page content 
as described above. 
One additional artifact of interest noted in the 'TL#' streams is the behavior of 
Internet Explorer when a page is opened from a link on another page.  In the 
example below (Figure 12), the search term 'Forensic Focus' was used in Google 
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and the first search hit was opened in a new tab by right clicking and selecting 
open in new tab.  The URL http://www.google.com appears twice in the 'TL#' 
stream containing the information for the tab in which 
http://www.forensicfocus.com was opened.  In addition, the full URL, including 
the search term used in Google, also appears in the stream.   
 
http://www.forensicfocus.com/ 
Digital Forensics - Digital Forensics, Computer Forensic 
Training, eDiscovery 
http://www.forensicfocus.com/ 
http://www.forensicfocus.com/ 
http://www.forensicfocus.com/ 
http://www.google.com/ 
http://www.forensicfocus.com/  
http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy&hl=en&q=forensic+focus&
aq=0&aqi=g4g-
o1&aql=f&oq=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.&fp=ce4eb09fec0d07a5  
…. 
<a href="http://www.forensicfocus.com" 
target="_blank"><img 
src="http://www.forensicfocus.com/images/other/forensic-
focus-button.gif" alt="Forensic Focus" border="0" /></a>  
http://www.google.com/ 
 
Figure 12 (Sample 'TL#' Stream Opened in New Tab) 
 
These artifacts also appear if the link is opened within the same tab.  While the 
location of this referring page information seems to vary slightly between pages, 
the last Unicode string always appears to be the URL of the referring page when 
the link is opened in a new tab, when appropriate. 
3.3.5 The 'TravelLog' Stream 
 
The 'TravelLog' stream contains the tabs back/forward information.  Data is 
stored as 4-byte integers in little endian that indicates the order the 'TL#' 
information should be displayed in when the user uses Internet Explorer forward 
or back options.  For example, if the user had navigated to three websites in a 
single tab, 'TL0', 'TL1', and 'TL2 streams should exist and the travel log may 
appear as it does in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 (Sample 'TravelLog' Stream as Viewed in CFX) 
 
As shown in Figure 13, the proper order of the 'TL#' information is 0x00000000, 
0x00000001, 0x00000002.  If property ID 0x00000004 in the '{0B00252A-8D48-
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4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' stream (discussed next) (which contains the currently 
displayed page number) contained the value 0x00000001, the website from 'TL0' 
would be displayed in Internet Explorer's 'Previous' menu.  The website from 
'TL1' would be displayed as Internet Explorer's current page while the website 
from 'TL2' would be displayed in Internet Explorer's 'Next' menu. 
 
3.3.6 The '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' Stream 
 
The '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' stream is a property set with the 
same GUID as that stored in the recovery store files that usually contains three 
properties (Figure 14). 
As with the recovery store files, the first common property value in this property 
set has numeric ID of 0x00000002 and a type value of VT_UI4 (4 byte unsigned 
integer).  When the browser crashes and the files ACR files remain in the '\Active' 
folder, this value is 0x00000005.  When the browser closes without process 
failure and the ACR files are moved to the '\Last Active' folder, this value is 
0x00000006.  The second common property value in this property set has 
numeric ID of 0x00000003 and a type value of VT_LPWSTR (Unicode string).  
This value should be the current URL of the tab.  The final common property 
value in this property set has numeric ID of 0x00000004 and a type value of 
VT_UI4 (4 byte unsigned integer).  This value should contain the number of the 
active 'TL#' stream.  For example, if the current tab is that stored under the 'TL3' 
stream, property 0x00000004 should read 0x00000003.  Other property IDs 
(0x00000007 and 0x00000008) were also occasionally seen in testing and were 
both a type value of VT_UI4 (4 byte unsigned integer).  At this time their 
significance is unknown. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 (The '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' Stream of a Tab 
Data File as Viewed in CFX) 
 
4. FILES OPENED IN INTERNET EXPLORER 
Although the most common use for Internet Explorer is web browsing, Internet 
Explorer can also be used to view files on the local machine.  Similar to web 
browsing, opening files from the local machine causes Internet Explorer to create 
recovery store and tab data files, although obviously the information stored within 
varies between local files and web browsing. 
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One common example of such an action might be opening Multipurpose Internet 
Mail Extension (MIME) Hypertext Markup Language (MHTML) (.mht) or web 
archive files.  MHTML files allow the user to save an entire web page and its 
resources to a single file, which can then be accessed offline at a later date or sent 
to another user.  The .mht format is the default format using the 'Save as' function 
in Internet Explorer. 
Notable differences in the tab data file include property ID 0x00000003 in the 
'{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' stream, which will store the full path 
of the file instead of the URL and the data stored in the 'TL#' stream for the tab in 
which the .mht file was opened (Figure 15). 
 
Users 
Users 
@shell32.dll,-21813 
[[blinded]] 
[[blinded]] 
Desktop 
Desktop 
@shell32.dll,-21769 
|  Google.mht 
Google.mht 
Google 
Users 
Users 
@shell32.dll,-21813 
john 
john 
Desktop 
Desktop 
@shell32.dll,-21769 
|  Google.mht 
Google.mht 
mhtml:file://C:\Users\[[blinded]]\Desktop\Google.mht 
file:///C:/Users/[[blinded]]/Desktop/Google.mht 
mhtml:file://C:\Users\[[blinded]]\Desktop\Google.mht  
… 
 
Figure 15 (Sample 'TL#' Stream From .mht File) 
 
As seen in Figure 15, the full path to the file, the page title and the user account 
along with other information is stored in the 'TL#' stream. 
Another instance in which a local file may be opened in Internet Explorer is when 
Internet Explorer is used as an image viewer.  As with .mht files, property ID 
0x00000003 in the '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96}' stream will store 
the full path of the file and the 'TL#' stream will contain information similar to 
what is shows in Figure 15. 
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5. MALWARE 
It is not uncommon for malware to open hidden Internet Explorer windows to 
access malicious sites, open command and control channels or simply increase the 
hit count of a website.  On a test machine, we opened a hidden Internet Explorer 
window to http://www.google.com using the VB code "Shell 
Environ("programfiles") & "\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe 
http://www.google.com", vbHide".  Analysis of the 
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active 
directory revealed the same artifacts were generated with the same content as 
when an Internet Explorer window was opened to http://www.google.com in a 
traditional manner. 
Knowing how and where Internet Explorer stores and verifies ACR files also 
presents an interesting mechanism for redirecting users to malicious websites.  By 
simply copying ACR files containing a malicious URL to the 
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active 
directory and modifying the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\Recovery\Active registry key, the user will be prompted to restore the 
last browsing session to the malicious site.   
6. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNET EXPLORER 8 AND 9 
Very little has changed with Automatic Crash Recovery between Internet 
Explorer 8 and 9.  Perhaps the single largest change took place in the 'FrameList' 
stream of the recovery store file.  While the 'FrameList' stream in Internet 
Explorer 8 only contained a list of the window numbers, the 'FrameList' stream in 
Internet Explorer 9 also includes the GUIDs of the tab data file active for that 
window (Figure 16).  
 
 
 
Figure 16 (FrameList Stream from Internet Explorer 9) 
 
The only other significant change took place in the '{0B00252A-8D48-4D0B-
7B79887F2B96}' stream of the recovery store and tab data files.  While property 
ID 0x00000002 was initially set to 0x00000005 in Internet Explorer 8 and only 
reset to 0x00000006 when Internet Explorer was closed normally, this property 
appears to be set to 0x00000006 at all times in Internet Explorer 9. 
 
7. ACR FILES IN UNALLOCATED SPACE 
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Only the most recently closed session information will remain in the '\Last Active' 
folder.  Once a more recent session is closed properly, the corresponding ACR 
files will be moved from the '\Active' folder to the '\Last Active' and the previous 
ACR files in the '\Last Active' will be deleted.  In order to obtain the most 
evidence from ACR files, it is vitally important to be able to find and carve them 
from unallocated space. 
 
The file header for the compound file is 0xD0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1 
(Microsoft, 2012a). However since the compound file format is not unique to 
ACR files, searching only for this header will likely create a large number of false 
positives when searching unallocated space.  Using other static fields in the file 
header, it is possible reduce the number of false positives.  Table 1 lists the static 
fields following the file signature and their byte offset. 
 
Table 1 
Byte Offset  Name    Value 
0x0008   Header CLSID   0x0000000000000000 
0x0018   Minor Version   0x003E 
0x001A   Major Version   0x0003 
0x001C   Byte Order   0xFFFE 
0x001E   Sector Size   0x0009 
0x0020   Mini Stream Sector Size  0x0006 
0x0022   Reserved   0x000000000000 
0x0028   Number of Directory Sector 0x00000000 
 
 
Using these static fields, we can build a search string of 0xD0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 
1A E1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3E 00 03 00 FE FF 09 
00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00.  This 44-byte search pattern will reduce 
false positives, but will still locate most compound files.  In all files reviewed, the 
first time the Unicode text 'http' appeared in the binary data was 2,500 to 3,500 
bytes from the file header.  The GUID of the ACR property sets, 0B00252A-
8D48-4D0B-7B79887F2B96, appears to be unique to these files and will also 
help reduce false positives when searching. 
Carving a compound file format file from unallocated space can be more 
complicated and time consuming than other file types because of the random 
nature of the file format and the fact that it does not contain a file footer.  
However it is still possible to accomplish using information from the file header 
and the file's FAT. 
Sector 0x1C contains a 2-byte value indicating the sector size used in the 
compound file.  This value should always be 0x0009 indicating 512 bytes (Figure 
17).
3
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Figure 17 (Sector Size) 
 
Sector 0x2C contains a 4 byte value indicating the number of FAT sectors in the 
file (Figure 18) (Microsoft, 2012a).  Each 512-byte FAT sector can address up to 
128 sectors within the file; since each sector is 512 bytes, each FAT sector 
accounts for up to 65,536 bytes of a file.  For example, if sector 0x2C's value is 
0x0002, the file must be larger than 65,536 bytes and smaller than 131,073 bytes. 
 
 
 
Figure 18 (Number of FAT Sectors) 
 
Sector 0x4C contains a 4-byte value containing the sector number of the first FAT 
sector (Figure 19) (Microsoft, 2012a).  This can be converted to an offset by using 
(sector number+1) x 512.  In this case, the first FAT sector begins at (3+1) x 512 
= 2048 or 0x800.  Since it has already been determined that this file contains only 
one FAT sector, the entire FAT must be located from 0x800 to 0x9FF (Figure 
20). 
 
 
 
Figure 19 (First FAT Sector Number) 
 
Much like the FAT file system on storage media, the FAT of a compound file 
contains a linked chain of sectors.  Each 4-byte FAT entry will contain the next 
sector in the chain or reserved value as seen in Table 2 (Microsoft, 2012a).
 
 
 Value     Description 
0x00000000 – 0xFFFFFFF9  Next Sector in Chain 
0xFFFFFFFA    Max Regular Sector Number 
0xFFFFFFFC    DIFAT Sector 
0xFFFFFFFD    FAT Sector 
 0xFFFFFFFE    End of Chain 
 0xFFFFFFFF    Unallocated Sector 
 
Table 2 
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To determine the total size of the file we should count the number of bytes from 
the beginning of the FAT to the last allocated sector (Figure 20).  The file size 
must be the number of bytes from the beginning of the FAT to the last allocated 
sector divided by 4 (because FAT each entry is four bytes), plus one (because the 
header is not included in the FAT) multiplied by 512 (the sector size).  In other 
words, (Number of Bytes / 4 + 1) x 512.  
 
 
 
Figure 20 (FAT) 
 
In the example shows in Figure 21, there are 40 bytes from the beginning of the 
FAT to the last allocated sector, which indicates there are nine allocated sectors in 
this file we should add one additional sector to include the header and multiply by 
512 bytes and the file size should be 5,120 bytes, which is confirmed by 
Windows.  With the total file size known it is now possible to carve the file from 
unallocated space. 
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Figure 21 (Allocated Sectors) 
 
If sector 0x2C indicates the file contains more than one FAT sector (Figure 22), 
the Double-Indirect File Allocation Table (DIFAT) must be used (Figure 23).  
The DIFAT is a directory of all the FAT sectors in the compound file and their 
offsets (Microsoft, 2012a).  Sector 0x4C, the 4-byte value containing the sector 
number of the first FAT sector mentioned previously is actually DIFAT[0].  The 
last 432 bytes of the 512-byte header contain DIFAT[1] through DIFAT[108].  In 
the case of Active Crash Recovery files, no file should ever come close to 
requiring 109 DIFAT entries.   
 
 
 
Figure 22 (Multiple FAT Sectors) 
 
Because of the nature of compound files, every sector addressed by a FAT sector 
must be allocated before a new FAT sector is created.  Accordingly, it is safe to 
assume that each FAT entry in every FAT sector except the last accounts for a 
fully allocated 512-byte sector within the file.  For example, if sector 0x4C 
indicates there are two FAT sectors, one must be completely allocated.  
Therefore, the file contains at least 65,536 bytes ((512 / 4) x 512).  The important 
entry in the DIFAT when determining the complete file size is the last entry.  
Since the header indicated this file contains two FAT sectors, the last entry should 
be DIFAT[1], which can be confirmed by examining offset 0x50 (DIFAT[1]).  
This contains a value of 0x0000003B and offset 0x54 (DIFAT[2]) indicates an 
unused value of 0x0FFFFFFFF.  0x3B = 59; using the formula (sector number + 
1) x 512, the second and final FAT sector should be located at offset 30,720 or 
0x7800. 
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Figure 23 (DIFAT) 
 
Once the last FAT sector has been located, calculating the file size the last FAT 
sector is done in the same manner as it was with only one FAT sector.  We should 
count the number of bytes from the beginning of the last FAT sector to the last 
allocated sector (Figure 24), divided by 4 (because FAT each entry is four bytes), 
plus one (because the header is not included in the FAT) multiplied by 512 (the 
sector size).  In other words, (Allocated Sectors / 4 + 1) x 512.   
 
 
 
Figure 24 (Second FAT Sector) 
 
In the example shown in Figure 25, there are eight bytes from the beginning of the 
last FAT sector to the last allocated sector, which indicates there are two allocated 
sectors, accounting for 1,024 bytes of the file plus an additional 512 bytes for the 
header for a total of 1,536 bytes.  It was already determined that each prior FAT 
sector accounts for 65,536 bytes.  In this case, there was only one prior FAT 
sector.  So 65,536 bytes can be added to the 1,536 bytes of the last FAT sector 
and header.  The final total in this case is 67,072 bytes, which is confirmed by 
Windows. 
 
This process can be expressed using the formula (((Total Number of FAT Sectors 
– 1) x 512 / 4) x 512) + ((Number of Bytes in the Last FAT Sector / 4 + 1) x 512).  
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Using the previous example, the equation would be (((2 – 1) x 512 / 4) x 512) + 
((8 / 4 + 1) x 512) = 67,072 bytes. 
 
 
 
Figure 25 (Second FAT Sector) 
 
Since files carved from unallocated space will no longer be associated with 
their file names (their GUIDs), it will not be possible to associate the tab data 
files with their respective recovery store files. 
 
8. RECOVERRS 
Based on the research of Internet Explorer's Automatic Crash Recovery files, two 
command line applications were developed called RipRS and ParseRS; 
collectively, these tools are known as RecoverRS. 
RipRS is designed to extract ACR files from a raw disk image using known 
decimal offsets.  A list of known offsets can be obtained by using the search string 
discussed in the above section (titled 'ACR Files in Unallocated Space') using 
programs such as EnCase or FTK.  Using these known offsets, RipRS uses the 
methodology discussed in the above section titled 'ACR Files in Unallocated 
Space' to determine the compound file's size.  RipRS first searches the compound 
file for the GUID that is unique to ACR files then searches the ACR file for 
strings unique to either recovery store files or tab data files to determine the file 
type.  Once RipRS has determined the ACR file type, the file is written to the 
output directory using the naming convention RecoveryStore.{offset<offset>}.dat 
or {offset<offset>}.dat for recovery store files and tab data files respectively. 
ParseRS is designed to extract browsing information from ACR files; either those 
found on the system or those carved from unallocated space by RipRS.  As 
mentioned previously, if ACR files are carved from unallocated space, 
information linking the tab data files with their respective recovery store files and 
some date/time information will be lost. 
RecoverRS can be downloaded from http://www.jtmoran.com/tools.  
 
9. CONCLUSION 
While the information recovered from the Automatic Crash Recovery files may 
not replace the bounty of information obtained from the cookies and the index.dat 
files of Internet Explorer, it provides yet another tool for examiners to retrieve 
valuable evidence.  As the Automatic Crash Recovery files seem to be a lesser 
known source of information, these files may provide valuable data when other 
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sources are not available as well as to supplement information found in other 
locations. 
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